Hyper-Optimism (anti-'Cassandras') Based on Low US NIII/NIIP ratio
An article written September 25 2006 in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.nwfdailynews.com/articleArchive/sep2006/foreigndebtteeth.php), has caused a big splash in the media (http://www.nwfdailynews.com/articleArchive/sep2006/foreigndebtteeth.php) and (http://www.finfacts.com/irelandbusinessnews/publish/article_10007389.shtml). The article stands half-way between pessimism and optimism, pessimistically alleging that for the first time in 90 years the net international investment income of the U.S. is negative and interest rates paid by the USA to foreigners on borrowed money could rise; and optimistically declaring that the higher return on investment enjoyed by US assets in foreign nations compared to foreign assets in the US, allow the US to sturdily shoulder the current account, trade deficit, net international investment position (NIIP), and net international investment income (NIII) deficits the US has developed.
The WSJ article states that at the beginning of 2006, what the WSJ calls "total US foreign debt" was at 13.6 trillion, while US owned foreign assets were at 11.1 trillion. Extropolating from the figures in the WSJ article, the net national investment income for the USA in 2005 was +14b and will be -10 billion in 2006.
The article claims this is the first time the US has experienced a significantly negative NIII, but actually apparently the NIII has been practically zero since 1988, and was at negative 14 billion in 2000, six years ago ( http://shelby.senate.gov/legislation/SteelDumping.pdf#search=%22%20%20%22net%20foreign%20investment%20income%22%202000%202005%22http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:_-8mHm0JLRQJ:shelby.senate.gov/legislation/SteelDumping.pdf+%22net+foreign+investment+income%22+2000+2005&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=13 ).
Some thoughts re the WSJ article:
From 2000-2004, there has been a 1103 billion decline in the US NIIP, meaning a 276 billion per year increase in the NIIP DEFICIT ( investment measured at current cost). ( http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:6o-VMUCpea8J:a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/15feb20061000/www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2006/B107.xls+2006+2005+2000+%22net+international+investment+position%22&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=19 ).Thus the USA is analogous to a nation that: owns no foreign assets; has a 13 trillion GDP; has borrowed 2.5 trillion from foreigners; is paying only 10 billion in interest per year on the 2.5 trillion borrowed; is borrowing another $276 billion every year. The low interest payments on the borrowed money represent symbolically how the USA's foreign assets have been providing high annual returns compared to the foreign held assets in the USA, as a result of which the NIII has stayed up while the NIIP has declined.
According to the WSJ article The low NIII/NIIP ratio situation is changing and can be expected to change with the passage of time as the foreign investments in the USA such as loans to the USA public and private sector provide higher and higher returns, as foreign creditors are paid higher and higher interest payments. Such is what you would expect, in a world where: capital is free to choose where to invest; and loans received from creditors are cashed in by creditors, so that the money has to be borrowed again from another creditor, who may not settle for as low an interest rate as the previous creditor.
Looks like the extent to which the US economy is based on impermanent factors such as cash on hand through sale of assets to foreigners and money borrowed from foreigners (represented by the NIIP), will increase dramatically in the future.
In 1997 the US GDP in 2000 chained dollars was 8703 trillion, and the US NIIP was 820 billion dollars, 9.4 percent of the 1997 GDP. In 2004 the US GDP was 10703 biillion and the US NIIP was negative 2500 billion, 23.4% of the 2004 GDP. Thus during these seven years, there was an annual increase from year to year of 14% in the indicator which defines what percent of the GDP the negative NIIP was.
Looking at the current trends, you could expect that by the year 2010, the US GDP will be 16.7 trillion, and that the US negative NIIP will be 42% of the GDP, or 7.0 trillion dollars.
So what you would have in 2010, would be a US economy analagous to an economy that has no foreign assets and has borrowed 7 trillion from foreigners, and is borrowing about 340 billion dollars per year from foreigners, but that, judging from the tone of the WSJ and related articles, prides itself on the fact that it only pays out 100 billion dollars a year in interest to the foreigners for the 7 trillion it has borrowed, which is only about 1.5%.
Those who apparently believe that this kind of projected 2010 economy is something to be proud of, because it is an economy that pays such a low interest on the money that it has borrowed neglect to consider, that the question of whether the interest paid on the borrowed money is 1% or 5% pales in comparison to the fact, that an economy whose negative NIIP is a equal to 42% of its GDP, is an economy that does not in fact exist if it has to repay even a significant fraction of what it has borrowed, and is unable to borrow any further.
The 2004 US economy featuring a negative NIIP equal to 23.4% of its GDP, was, given the fact that a dollar of borrowed foreign money can add $20 to the GDP as it circulates in the economy, already similar to an economy that would cease to exist if it had to repay the 23.4% of its GDP that it had borrowed; how much more is such the case when the negative NIIP is equal to 42% of the GDP?
What difference does it make if you are paying only 1% in interest on the money borrowed from foreigners that your economy is running on, if your economy ceases to exist if you have to repay what you borrowed to even a fraction of your foreign creditors and then cannot find new creditors to replace the foreign creditors who have bailed out? Even with low interest rates paid on money borrowed from foreigners, there is the problem of the economy running on the money borrowed, (an impermanent and artificial source basis for an economy) as it circulates from hand to hand inside of the economy.
Eight percent of the 1982 biillion in foreign official assets in the US (2004), or 194 billion, is possibly something other than loans to the US govt and US private sectors. Of the 9555 billion in non-official foreign assets in the USA (2004), 1709 billion was in investment and 1929 billion in US corporate stocks held by foreigners. Thus of the total 11537 billion of foreign owned assets in the USA (2004), 3832 billion, only 33 percent, was in something other than some kind of loan to the USA public or private sector. See http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3SUR/is_7_85/ai_n15343294/pg_3.
Foreign holders of assets might have some trouble bailing out of investment in the US and ownership of US stocks by selling these investments to Americans; but they would experience relatively less trouble simply bailing out on short term loans they have made to the USA public and private sectors.
Some say falls in the value of the dollar favor the US debtor vs foreign creditors. They seem to ignore that a fall in the value of the dollar would not only decrease the amount paid annually to foreign creditors, it would also decrease the GDP and the value of the money that had been borrowed from the foreign creditors in the first place.
@2006 David Virgil Hobbs
The WSJ article states that at the beginning of 2006, what the WSJ calls "total US foreign debt" was at 13.6 trillion, while US owned foreign assets were at 11.1 trillion. Extropolating from the figures in the WSJ article, the net national investment income for the USA in 2005 was +14b and will be -10 billion in 2006.
The article claims this is the first time the US has experienced a significantly negative NIII, but actually apparently the NIII has been practically zero since 1988, and was at negative 14 billion in 2000, six years ago ( http://shelby.senate.gov/legislation/SteelDumping.pdf#search=%22%20%20%22net%20foreign%20investment%20income%22%202000%202005%22http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:_-8mHm0JLRQJ:shelby.senate.gov/legislation/SteelDumping.pdf+%22net+foreign+investment+income%22+2000+2005&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=13 ).
Some thoughts re the WSJ article:
From 2000-2004, there has been a 1103 billion decline in the US NIIP, meaning a 276 billion per year increase in the NIIP DEFICIT ( investment measured at current cost). ( http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:6o-VMUCpea8J:a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/15feb20061000/www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2006/B107.xls+2006+2005+2000+%22net+international+investment+position%22&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=19 ).Thus the USA is analogous to a nation that: owns no foreign assets; has a 13 trillion GDP; has borrowed 2.5 trillion from foreigners; is paying only 10 billion in interest per year on the 2.5 trillion borrowed; is borrowing another $276 billion every year. The low interest payments on the borrowed money represent symbolically how the USA's foreign assets have been providing high annual returns compared to the foreign held assets in the USA, as a result of which the NIII has stayed up while the NIIP has declined.
According to the WSJ article The low NIII/NIIP ratio situation is changing and can be expected to change with the passage of time as the foreign investments in the USA such as loans to the USA public and private sector provide higher and higher returns, as foreign creditors are paid higher and higher interest payments. Such is what you would expect, in a world where: capital is free to choose where to invest; and loans received from creditors are cashed in by creditors, so that the money has to be borrowed again from another creditor, who may not settle for as low an interest rate as the previous creditor.
Looks like the extent to which the US economy is based on impermanent factors such as cash on hand through sale of assets to foreigners and money borrowed from foreigners (represented by the NIIP), will increase dramatically in the future.
In 1997 the US GDP in 2000 chained dollars was 8703 trillion, and the US NIIP was 820 billion dollars, 9.4 percent of the 1997 GDP. In 2004 the US GDP was 10703 biillion and the US NIIP was negative 2500 billion, 23.4% of the 2004 GDP. Thus during these seven years, there was an annual increase from year to year of 14% in the indicator which defines what percent of the GDP the negative NIIP was.
Looking at the current trends, you could expect that by the year 2010, the US GDP will be 16.7 trillion, and that the US negative NIIP will be 42% of the GDP, or 7.0 trillion dollars.
So what you would have in 2010, would be a US economy analagous to an economy that has no foreign assets and has borrowed 7 trillion from foreigners, and is borrowing about 340 billion dollars per year from foreigners, but that, judging from the tone of the WSJ and related articles, prides itself on the fact that it only pays out 100 billion dollars a year in interest to the foreigners for the 7 trillion it has borrowed, which is only about 1.5%.
Those who apparently believe that this kind of projected 2010 economy is something to be proud of, because it is an economy that pays such a low interest on the money that it has borrowed neglect to consider, that the question of whether the interest paid on the borrowed money is 1% or 5% pales in comparison to the fact, that an economy whose negative NIIP is a equal to 42% of its GDP, is an economy that does not in fact exist if it has to repay even a significant fraction of what it has borrowed, and is unable to borrow any further.
The 2004 US economy featuring a negative NIIP equal to 23.4% of its GDP, was, given the fact that a dollar of borrowed foreign money can add $20 to the GDP as it circulates in the economy, already similar to an economy that would cease to exist if it had to repay the 23.4% of its GDP that it had borrowed; how much more is such the case when the negative NIIP is equal to 42% of the GDP?
What difference does it make if you are paying only 1% in interest on the money borrowed from foreigners that your economy is running on, if your economy ceases to exist if you have to repay what you borrowed to even a fraction of your foreign creditors and then cannot find new creditors to replace the foreign creditors who have bailed out? Even with low interest rates paid on money borrowed from foreigners, there is the problem of the economy running on the money borrowed, (an impermanent and artificial source basis for an economy) as it circulates from hand to hand inside of the economy.
Eight percent of the 1982 biillion in foreign official assets in the US (2004), or 194 billion, is possibly something other than loans to the US govt and US private sectors. Of the 9555 billion in non-official foreign assets in the USA (2004), 1709 billion was in investment and 1929 billion in US corporate stocks held by foreigners. Thus of the total 11537 billion of foreign owned assets in the USA (2004), 3832 billion, only 33 percent, was in something other than some kind of loan to the USA public or private sector. See http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3SUR/is_7_85/ai_n15343294/pg_3.
Foreign holders of assets might have some trouble bailing out of investment in the US and ownership of US stocks by selling these investments to Americans; but they would experience relatively less trouble simply bailing out on short term loans they have made to the USA public and private sectors.
Some say falls in the value of the dollar favor the US debtor vs foreign creditors. They seem to ignore that a fall in the value of the dollar would not only decrease the amount paid annually to foreign creditors, it would also decrease the GDP and the value of the money that had been borrowed from the foreign creditors in the first place.
@2006 David Virgil Hobbs
posted by David Virgil at 1:19 PM
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