Low Quality of Pro-War Arguments Indicates Nation Should for Now Refrain from Risky Military Adventures
Various reasons have been put forth by both the pro-war and the anti-war factions re the question, why should the US get involved in combat in Afghanistan/Iraq/Iran? These reasons include: the suppression of 'terrorism'; the defense of Israel'; the strategic need to gain control over foreign sources of oil; the defense of the United States.
These excuses for combat operations against Muslim middle eastern nations have been backed up by pro-war people with laundry lists listing the advantages of US combat operations in such middle eastern muslim nations, or listing the dis-advantages of not engaging in such attacks.
Such laundry lists are inadequate defenses of the proposed combat actions, because they fail to take into account: the cost-benefit ratio of the proposed combat operations compared to the cost-benefit of using the funds spent on combat operations for other purposes; the probability that given actions will produce various possible cost-benefit outcomes.
With regards to a range of various possible policy options, the options vary in terms of the likelihood that they would produce a given cost-benefit outcome--such has to be taken into account by competent policy analysis of the level one would expect from a well staffed well funded entity such as the US govenrment, especially when the matter is as serious as a large war.
For example, the US could replace imported oil with domestic sources through a tax on imported oil, subsidies for domestic sources, rationing, or various combinations of such measures (some such combinations would prove more palatable than others to the ivory-tower-purist-fanatic-free-trade-theoreticians). Such would create spin-off effects in terms of the domestic producers spending the money they receive for the alternative energy supplies domestically, those selling to the domestic energy producers spending their money domestically, and so on and so forth.
(The free-trade purist-fanatics are blind to how sometimes a slightly more expensive domestic resource is preferable to a slightly less expensive foreign resource; history is filled with examples of the failure of those who are afflicted by such blindness and the success of those who are not).
The fact is, it is easier to predict with a relatively high degree of certainty, what the cost-benefit outcome of switching to domestic energy resources would be, than it is to predict what the cost-benefit outcomes of military adventures such as combat in Iraq/Afghanistan/Iran would be. Meaning, the situation is similar to say, there is a 90 percent probability that switching to domestic energy resources would boost the real actual (as opposed to the phony economy based on impermanent sources such as borrowed foreign money) economy by at least 20%; but all we can say regarding a war with Iran is that there is a 20% chance that it would be more productive than counterproductive, in terms of accomplishing its objectives.
One way to estimate such percentage probability rates is to look at the success rates of such predictions in the past. Historically the US has not enjoyed a high degree of accuracy predicting the outcomes of its military adventures or various stages of its military adventures; but the prediction of the effects of economic policies, though subject to fraud, had advanced to a high state of the art.
Along this line it is simple common sense, that for example if with option A, every time I bet a dollar, there is a ten percent chance of me winning twenty dollars, and a ninety percent chance of me losing my bet, and with option B there is a twenty percent chance of me winning fifteen dollars, and an eighty percent chance of me losing my bet, in such a situation option B is the better choice because though I win less if I win, the chance of me winning is greater.
One would expect in situation such as we have now where the case for war is far from obvious, that a huge well staffed and well funded federal government to when discussing a huge serious matter such as a war, look at the probability of success for various options as well as at the cost/benefit compared to other possible options. When instead the government only presents laundry lists of advantages and disadvantages, one is led to suspect that the actions proposed are designed to serve special interests foreign and domestic, as opposed to the general interest foreign and domestic; and one is led to suspect that the government is incompetent in the art of weighing various possible options against each other.
Common sense declares that at times when the government is incompetent and/or in subservience to special interests foreign and domestic, the nation should so to speak "freeze", come to a halt, and refrain from embarking on risky expensive military adventures. At such times it becomes probable that the government would make better use of its resources, if it waited until it became competent and freed itself of subservience to special interests and foreign interests, before it embarked on any risky and dangerous adventure such as a war with Iran.
Common sense declares that in such situations as the US finds itself in now, the burden of proof should be on those who advocate a risky dangerous act such as a new war, as opposed to on those who advocate refraining from engaging in any such new and strange proposed military adventure.
@2006 David Virgil Hobbs
These excuses for combat operations against Muslim middle eastern nations have been backed up by pro-war people with laundry lists listing the advantages of US combat operations in such middle eastern muslim nations, or listing the dis-advantages of not engaging in such attacks.
Such laundry lists are inadequate defenses of the proposed combat actions, because they fail to take into account: the cost-benefit ratio of the proposed combat operations compared to the cost-benefit of using the funds spent on combat operations for other purposes; the probability that given actions will produce various possible cost-benefit outcomes.
With regards to a range of various possible policy options, the options vary in terms of the likelihood that they would produce a given cost-benefit outcome--such has to be taken into account by competent policy analysis of the level one would expect from a well staffed well funded entity such as the US govenrment, especially when the matter is as serious as a large war.
For example, the US could replace imported oil with domestic sources through a tax on imported oil, subsidies for domestic sources, rationing, or various combinations of such measures (some such combinations would prove more palatable than others to the ivory-tower-purist-fanatic-free-trade-theoreticians). Such would create spin-off effects in terms of the domestic producers spending the money they receive for the alternative energy supplies domestically, those selling to the domestic energy producers spending their money domestically, and so on and so forth.
(The free-trade purist-fanatics are blind to how sometimes a slightly more expensive domestic resource is preferable to a slightly less expensive foreign resource; history is filled with examples of the failure of those who are afflicted by such blindness and the success of those who are not).
The fact is, it is easier to predict with a relatively high degree of certainty, what the cost-benefit outcome of switching to domestic energy resources would be, than it is to predict what the cost-benefit outcomes of military adventures such as combat in Iraq/Afghanistan/Iran would be. Meaning, the situation is similar to say, there is a 90 percent probability that switching to domestic energy resources would boost the real actual (as opposed to the phony economy based on impermanent sources such as borrowed foreign money) economy by at least 20%; but all we can say regarding a war with Iran is that there is a 20% chance that it would be more productive than counterproductive, in terms of accomplishing its objectives.
One way to estimate such percentage probability rates is to look at the success rates of such predictions in the past. Historically the US has not enjoyed a high degree of accuracy predicting the outcomes of its military adventures or various stages of its military adventures; but the prediction of the effects of economic policies, though subject to fraud, had advanced to a high state of the art.
Along this line it is simple common sense, that for example if with option A, every time I bet a dollar, there is a ten percent chance of me winning twenty dollars, and a ninety percent chance of me losing my bet, and with option B there is a twenty percent chance of me winning fifteen dollars, and an eighty percent chance of me losing my bet, in such a situation option B is the better choice because though I win less if I win, the chance of me winning is greater.
One would expect in situation such as we have now where the case for war is far from obvious, that a huge well staffed and well funded federal government to when discussing a huge serious matter such as a war, look at the probability of success for various options as well as at the cost/benefit compared to other possible options. When instead the government only presents laundry lists of advantages and disadvantages, one is led to suspect that the actions proposed are designed to serve special interests foreign and domestic, as opposed to the general interest foreign and domestic; and one is led to suspect that the government is incompetent in the art of weighing various possible options against each other.
Common sense declares that at times when the government is incompetent and/or in subservience to special interests foreign and domestic, the nation should so to speak "freeze", come to a halt, and refrain from embarking on risky expensive military adventures. At such times it becomes probable that the government would make better use of its resources, if it waited until it became competent and freed itself of subservience to special interests and foreign interests, before it embarked on any risky and dangerous adventure such as a war with Iran.
Common sense declares that in such situations as the US finds itself in now, the burden of proof should be on those who advocate a risky dangerous act such as a new war, as opposed to on those who advocate refraining from engaging in any such new and strange proposed military adventure.
@2006 David Virgil Hobbs
posted by David Virgil at 7:35 AM
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